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COMMENTS
Criminal Procedure-The North Carolina Fair Sentencing Actt
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT
North Carolina's presumptive sentencing bill, the Fair Sentencing Act,1
capped several years' examination of the State criminal justice system con-
ducted by the General Assembly's Commission on Correctional Programs. 2
The Commission examined correctional programs in North Carolina and de-
termined that disparities in sentences and time served in prison were primary
causes of prison unrest.3 The Commission concluded that certain sentences
are more effective at deterring crime than uncertain ones,4 and unbridled dis-
cretion afforded judges and the parole authorities were major factors in the
wide variation among sentences imposed for similar offenses. 5 Influenced in
part by the report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal
Sentencing, 6 the Commission recommended adoption of a presumptive sen-
tencing system in North Carolina.7 The Commission's bill was introduced in
the legislature in 1977 but died in committee in both the House and the Sen-
ate, in part because of time pressures caused by consideration of other pro-
posed legislation and in part because of opposition from the legal community
t The author wishes to thank Stevens H. Clarke and Elizabeth W. Rubinsky of the Institute
of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, for their assistance in gathering
information and for their critical guidance in the preparation of this Comment.
1. The Fair Sentencing Act was originally enacted in 1979 as "An Act to Establish a Fair
Sentencing System in North Carolina Criminal Courts." Law of June 4, 1979, ch. 760, 1979 N.C.
Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 850. Technical amendments to the Act were passed in the next legislative
session. Law of June 25, 1980, ch. 1316, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 247. The final amend-
ments discussed in this Comment were passed in the 1981 session. Law of Apr. 6, 1981, ch. 179,
[1981] 2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 84 (codified in scattered sections of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14, 15A,
18A, 20, 21, 53, 90, 105, 108, 130, 148, 163 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). For an excellent summary and text
of the Act, see S. Clarke and E. Rubinsky, North Carolina's Fair Sentencing Act: Explanation,
Text, and Felony Classification Table, No. 81.7 (rev. ed. 1981) (available through the Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
2. The legislature originally designated this group as the Commission on Sentencing, Crimi-
nal Punishment and Rehabilitation but renamed it when the Commission's life was extended in
1975. North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers Education Foundation, History of Presumptive
Sentencing and Provisions of the N.C. Law, Presumptive Sentencing and Jury Trial of a DUI
Case 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Presumptive Sentencing].
3. Interview with the Honorable Frank W. Snepp, Jr., Resident Superior Court Judge for
Mecklenburg County, in Charlotte, N.C. (Feb. 21, 1980).
4. North Carolina has the third longest average time served for felonies in the United
States. Nat'l L.J., Feb. 23, 1981, at 21, col 1, and at 28, col. 3.
5. Presumptive Sentencing, supra note 2, at 2.
6. Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, Fair and Certain Punish-
ment (1976). Other influential books on this topic include American Friends Service Committee,
Struggle for Justice (1971); D. Fogel, We Are the Living Proof (1975); M. Frankel, Criminal
Sentences (1973); A. Von Hirsh, Doing Justice (1976); J. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (1975).
7. Letter from Stevens H. Clarke to Rep. James Ezzell (Sept. 20, 1979) (copy available in the
N.C.L. Rev. office).
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to the Act itself.8
At the suggestion of Governor James B. Hunt, Jr., the North Carolina Bar
Association established a special Committee on Sentencing to revise the origi-
nal bill to make it more palatable to judges and lawyers.9 Critics of the origi-
nal and subsequent versions of the bill "[had] argued that the Law could
lengthen the time it takes to try a case, increase the number of cases, add to the
number of appeals before the burdened North Carolina Court of Appeals and
the North Carolina Supreme Court and increase the state's prison popula-
tion," 10 and some judges had opposed the bill because it attempted to struc-
ture their sentencing discretion. 1 The bill as finally introduced to the
legislature reflected minor changes by the bar association and the governor
and was renamed the Fair Sentencing Act. 12 The 1979 General Assembly
passed the Act, effective for felonies occurring on or after July 1, 1980.'
3
Prior to the effective date, however, a Sentencing Procedures Committee
was appointed by Governor Hunt and Chief Justice Branch to "provide for
the planning, implementation and review of The Fair Sentencing Act.' ' t4 Be-
cause the Act had engendered considerable debate in the legislature and in the
legal community, and because procedures for its implementation were not
complete, its effective date was delayed. 15 Some technical amendments sug-
gested by the Committee were approved along with the extension of the Act's
effective date, but the more substantive changes were delayed until the 1981
8. Id. It was Governor Hunt's view that the Knox bill failed because of opposition from
judges and practicing attorneys. Id.
9. Id.
10. Legal Community Set at Last for Sentencing Act, News & Observer (Raleigh), June 29,
1981, at 1, 6, col. 1.
11. Fair Sentencing Act Faces New Delay, News & Observer (Raleigh), Feb. 25, 1981, at 17,
col. 3.
12. Letter, supra note 7.
13. Law of June 4, 1979, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 850.
14. The Committee, which is still active, was given the following mandate:
a. Review the Fair Sentencing Act to ensure that the legislation is technically cor-
rect and draft legislation to make technical changes if they are needed;
b. Develop for Supreme Court approval new sentencing procedures, which may
include such items as superior court rules of procedure and procedures governing
presentence reporting, to be used by Superior Court judges in applying the provisions of
the Act;
c. Develop guidelines for sentencing convicted felons that harmonize with the
Act's provisions;
d. Review the impact of the Act upon the criminal justice system and, if needed,
recommend modifications to the Law which may be needed to alleviate anticipated
problems;
e. Monitor the Courts' experience with the Act, including the overseeing of studies
made of the Act after its implementation date.
Institute of Government Legislative Bulletin Services, The Fair Sentencing Act, Weekly Summary
(Apr. 3, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Weekly Summary].
15. The effective date was postponed from July 1, 1980, to March 1, 1981. Law of June 25,
1980, ch. 1316, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 247. Its effective date was once again postponed by
amendment from March 1, 1981, to April 15, 1981. Law of Feb. 27, 1981, ch. 63, [1981] 1 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 82.
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session of the legislature.16
The 1981 General Assembly removed entry of a negotiated plea from the
list of mitigating factors and provided that the judge need make no findings of
aggravating and mitigating factors if an active prison term is imposed pursu-
ant to a "plea arrangement as to sentence under Article 58 of [Chapter
15A]." 17 It also revised and increased the number of aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors that the trial court must consider before sentencing and reduced the
presumptive prison term approximately twenty-five percent for several classes
of felonies. Finally the effective date was again extended, this time to July 1,
1981.18 In response to legislative concern about the prison population, the
Governor agreed to appoint a study commission to review the severity of
sentences in North Carolina. 19
II. SENTENCING UNDER THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT
The Fair Sentencing Act, as finally passed, revamps much of the sentenc-
ing procedure in North Carolina and specifies four purposes of sentencing.
The first purpose is "to impose a punishment commensurate with the injury
the offense has caused, taking into account factors that may diminish or in-
crease the offender's culpability."20 Additional purposes are "to protect the
public by restraining offenders," to assist in rehabilitation of offenders, and to
deter criminal behavior.21 Thus, the starting point in sentencing must be the
actual offense of which the defendant was convicted, followed by considera-
tion of special circumstances surrounding the crime and special characteristics
of the individual offender.
The sentencing procedures in the Act apply only tofelonies committed on
or after July 1, 1981.22 Every felony is assigned to a category of offenses,23
ranging from Class A, which includes first-degree murder,24 to Class J, which
includes various financial offenses such as credit card theft25 as well as all
offenses not assigned to another category.26
Every class is assigned a maximum prison term27 and a presumptive
16. S. Clarke, An Update on the Fair Sentencing Act, Administration of Justice Memoranda
No. 80/06 (Nov. 1980).
17. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). See notes 94-99 and accompanying
text infra.
18. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
19. Weekly Summary, supra note 14.
20. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.3 (Curn. Supp. 1981).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 15A-1340.1(a). See text accompanying note 18 supra.
23. See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14 (1981).
24. Id. § 14-17.
25. Id. § 14-113.9 to -113.15. Class J also includes transporting a child outside the state with
the intent to violate a custody order, id. § 14-320.1, and two escape offenses, id. § 148-45(b) & (c)
(1978 and Cum. Supp. 1981).
26. Id. § 14-1.1(b) (1981). For a complete listing of felony classifications, see S. Clarke & E.
Rubinsky, supra note 1, at 40-62.
27. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-1.1(a) (1981).
1982]
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prison term.28 The Act does away with former law that allowed judges to set
both a minimum and a maximum term; only a single prison term is set. The
presumptive term reflects the legislature's determination of the appropriate
sentence for every felony within the class when no extenuating circumstances
are present; however, the Act left unchanged the wide range of possible
sentences for each class. For example, a Class C felon could receive a prison
term as long as fifty years29 or a suspended sentence with no imprisonment at
all. The maximum terms range from a possible death sentence for a Class A
offense3" to three years imprisonment for a Class J offense.31 A prisoner may
reduce the time he actually serves through statutorily provided "good time"
and "gain time" as well as through reentry parole.32 The following table lists
examples of offenses in each class, the applicable maximum punishment, the
average time served for the indicated offenses by felons released from prison
in 1980, the statutory presumptive, and the projected time a prisoner actually
will serve if one assumes that he has received the presumptive term and will
receive all possible good time and reentry parole but no gain time after enter-
ing prison.
TABLE 1
Class Sample Offense/ Maximum Average Time Presumptive
Statute Punishment Served Under Term/Projected
Former Law3 3  Term Served
3 4
[S.S.=Sample Size] (in years)
(in years)
A Murder in the Death/Life
3 5
First Degree (G.S. Imprisonment
14-17)
28. Id. § 15A-1340.4(f) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
29. Id. § 14-1.1(a) (1981).
30. Id. § 14-1.1(a)(1).
31. Id. § 14-1.1(a)(10).
32. See notes 103-29 and accompanying text infra.
33. These figures were obtained from a statistical study conducted by the Institute of
Government (copy available in the N.C.L. Rev. office). The number listed is the average time
served by felons who (1) were not committed youthful offenders, (2) were serving sentences for
only one crime and (3) were released from prison for the first time during fiscal year 1980. It
includes those released on parole as well as those who were unconditionally released.
A similar study was conducted by the National Law Journal. That study used release data on
prisoners paroled in either 1976 or 1977 and determined that North Carolina's felons served an
average time in prison of 35 months. Time served for specific types of felonies ranged from 109
months for forcible rape to 17 months for car theft. Nat'l L.J., Feb. 23, 1981, at 1, col. 1, and at 28,
col. 3.
34. The second figure is the projected time each felon will serve in prison. It is determined by
subtracting from the presumptive term the good time available to each felon, which is one-half of
the presumptive term in the absence of serious misconduct. Also subtracted is the ninety day
automatic parole available to every felon sentenced to more than eighteen months imprisonment
except those convicted of offenses for which there is a statutory minimum term of imprisonment.
The amount of gain time that a particular felon will receive is difficult to predict; thus that time
has not been subtracted from the projected time although many prisoners may reduce
significantly, through gain time, the actual time served. See notes 103-29 and accompanying text
infra.
35. Persons convicted of the Class A offense, murder in the first degree, are excluded from
the ambit of the Fair Sentencing Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). These
[Vol. 60
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B Rape in the First Life
Degree (G.S. 14- Imprisonment3 6
21(1))
C Arson of occupied 50 years or life Unavailable 15/7.25
dwelling (G.S. 14- imprisonment
58) and/or fine
D Second Degree 40 years and/or 5.54 12/5.75
Murder (G.S. 14- fine [S.S. 60]
17)
Robbery with Unavailable 3 7  14/738
Dangerous
Weapon (G.S. 14-
87)
E Embezzlement of 30 years and/or 1.11 9/4.25
bank funds (G.S. fine [S.S. 13]
53-129)
F Voluntary 20 years and/or 3.21 6/2.75
Manslaughter fine [S.S. 63]
(G.S. 14-18; 14-19)
G Assault with Intent 15 years and/or 3.28 [4.5/2]
3 9
to Rape (G.S. 14- fine [S.S. 22]
22)
H Felonious Larceny 10 years and/or 1.30 3/1.25
(G.S. 14-72(a); fine [S.S. 99]
G.S. 14-71)
Common Law 2.07
Robbery Without [S.S. 91]
Dangerous
Weapons (G.S. 14-
2; 14-3(b); 14-87.1)
1 Forgery (G.S. 14- 5 years and/or 1.43 2/.75
119; 14-120; 14- fine [S.S. 35]
122; 14-123; 14-
124)
felons will be sentenced according to the procedure detailed in section 15A-2000. See id. § 15A-
2000.
36. Class B offenses, first-degree sexual offenses, are also excluded from the Act. Id. § 15A-
1340.1(a). After State v. Montgomery, 291 N.C. 91, 104, 229 S.E.2d 572, 581 (1976), the maximum
permissible sentence for a Class B offense is life imprisonment. A person sentenced to life
imprisonment, under previous and current law, is eligible for parole after twenty years if no
minimum term was set by the judge. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1371(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
37. Accurate figures are unavailable because of changes in the Act not reflected in the study.
In 1977 the statutory minimum term for armed robbery was changed from five to seven years.
Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 871, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1190 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
87(c) (1981)). All prisoners released during this study were sentenced prior to 1977.
38. There are several offenses for which there is a statutorily prescribed minimum prison
term under prior law and under the Act. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-52, -87 & § 90-95(h)
(1981). Despite reclassification under the Fair Sentencing Act, a term may not be imposed that
will result in less time served than statutorily mandated. Thus, a person convicted of armed
robbery must be sentenced to at least fourteen years imprisonment so he will not serve less than
the statutory mandate of seven years. He presumably would not be eligible for the normal re-
entry parole of ninety days until he had served the seven years. Id. § 14-87.
39. The statute establishing the crime of assault with intent to rape has been repealed. The
applicable crime would now be either attempted first-degree rape or sexual offense, Class F
offenses, or attempted second-degree rape or sexual offense, Class H offenses. Id. § 14-27.6. For
Class G offenses, such as incest with certain near relatives, see id. § 14-178, the presumptive term
is 4.5 years and the projected term served is two years.
1982]
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J Financial 3 years and/or Unavailable 1/.540
Transaction Card fine
Theft (G.S. 14-
113.9)
The sentencing judge may elect to suspend the sentence and place the
offender on supervised or unsupervised probation unless he is convicted of a
Class A or B offense or an offense such as armed robbery, burglary or a repeat
felony using a deadly weapon, for which specified active imprisonment is
mandatory.41 If the offender is less than twenty-one at the time of conviction
and is not convicted of a capital or mandatory life offense, the trial judge must
determine whether to sentence him as a committed youthful offender,42 which
makes him eligible for parole at any time under preexisting law,43 or as a
regular felon after making a finding that he "should not obtain the benefit of
release." 44 But in both cases the Act is still applicable. Even if the sentencing
judge chooses to suspend the time of imprisonment entirely or chooses to sen-
tence the felon as a committed youthful offender, he must comply with the
procedure detailed in G.S. 15A-1340.4(a) for setting the prison term.45 The
judge may also decide whether terms are to run consecutively or concurrently
for multiple offenses.46 Sentencing decisions on suspension, committed youth-
ful offender commitment and consecutive terms do not require any statement
of reasons by the judge; thus he maintains areas of unregulated discretion.
Several groups are exempted from the findings requirement of the Act.
G.S. 15A-1340.4(a) exempts Class A and B felons from its coverage.47 More
important, the judge is not required to impose the presumptive sentence or
make a statement of reasons for variance from the presumptive term when "he
imposes a prison term pursuant to any plea arrangement as to sentence under
Article 58 [of Chapter 15A].1'48 It is unclear exactly what is meant by "plea
arrangement as to sentence pursuant to Article 58" under the Act. It may
mean that the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence and
the sentencing judge has ratified that decision or that the prosecutor has sim-
ply agreed to recommend no more than a particular term or not to oppose a
term. G.S. 15A-1023 makes judicial approval of a sentence arrangement a
prerequisite to its imposition;49 thus judges must be careful to specify that the
40. Reentry parole is not available for persons sentenced to less than eighteen months
imprisonment. Id. § 15A-1380.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
41. Id. §§ 15A-1340.4(a), -1341(b).
42. Id. § 148-49.14 (1978).
43. If an offender is sentenced as a committed youthful offender he is eligible for parole at
any time. Id. § 148-49.15. See notes 124-25 and accompanying text infra.
44. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-49.14 (1978).
45. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
46. Id. § 15A-1354(a).
47. Class A offenders may be sentenced to death or life imprisonment while Class B offenders
only may receive life imprisonment. Id. § 14-1.1(1), (2) (1981). For the procedure for sentencing
Class A offenders, see id. § 15A-2000 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See notes 35 & 36 supra.
48. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
49. Id. § 15A-1023.
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sentence given was pursuant to a plea arrangement as to sentence5" because
the judge need not follow the Act's procedures if he adopts a sentence agreed
upon by the defendant and the prosecutor. Furthermore, the defendant may
not appeal as of right a term greater than the presumptive term if it was im-
posed pursuant to a sentence arrangement. Because of the large number of
felons who plead guilty pursuant to "plea arrangements as to sentence" this
provision significantly reduces the number of cases in which specific findings
must be made.5 1
For defendants convicted of Class C through J felonies, the judge must
impose the presumptive term for the offense unless he determines that there
are sufficient aggravating or mitigating circumstances to justify a longer or
shorter term. Prior to imposing a prison term, he must consider all the statu-
tory aggravating and mitigating factors present in the case, and he may con-
sider any additional aggravating and mitigating factors reasonably related to
sentencing purposes.5 2 All factors considered must be proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. If he ultimately decides to impose the presumptive term
he need not make any specific findings for the record; 53 however, if he chooses
to impose a term other than the presumptive term, after considering the aggra-
vating and mitigating factors, he must "specifically list in the record" the rele-
vant aggravating and mitigating circumstances.5 4 These factors must be
individually proved by a preponderance of the evidence and must be reason-
ably related to the sentencing purposes listed earlier.55 In order to justify a
term longer than the presumptive, the factors in aggravation must be found to
outweigh the factors in mitigation; for a sentence shorter than the presumptive
term the factors in mitigation must outweigh those in aggravation.
5 6
The Act contains detailed lists of both aggravating and mitigating fac-
50. The form devised by the Administrative Office of the Courts for the implementation of
the Act provides a box to be checked if the prison term is imposed pursuant to a plea arrangement
as to sentence. Form AOC-CR 301 (copy available in the N.C.L. Rev. office).
51. According to preliminary results of a sentencing study conducted by the Institute of Gov-
ernment of the University of North Carolina, 58.6% of persons charged with one or more felonies
pleaded guilty; 33.2% entered formal guilty pleas on the record, with 27% of the pleas resulting
rom a prosecutorial recommendation on sentence. Some of these guilty pleas were to misde-
meanors and not the felony for which the individual was originally charged; 34% of those charged
either had their case dismissed or received a prayer for judgment continued (PJC). Only 6.8%
went to trial and 75.3% of those who went to trial were convicted. In absolute numbers, 80% of the
1378 individuals in the study who were charged with felonies pleaded guilty. Another 474 were
not convicted and did not go to trial. Ninety-three persons went to trial, with only twenty-three
of those receiving acquittals. S. Clarke, S. Kurtz, D. Schleicher & E. Rubinsky, Felony Prosecu-
tion and Sentencing in North Carolina, 1979-1980, at 14-16 & Table 3 (Institute of Government,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1981) (preliminary draft) [hereinafter cited as Clarke
& Kurtz].
For an excellent article on plea bargaining in North Carolina, see Lefstein, Plea Bargaining
and the Trial Judge, The New ABA Standards, and the Need to Control Judicial Discretion, 59
N.C.L. Rev. 477 (1981)
52. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
53. Id. § 15A-1340.4(b).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a). See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
56. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
1982]
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tors. 57 It does not state the weight each factor must be given when balancing
them. This task is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge.
The Act prohibits the use of certain kinds of evidence in sentencing.
First, any evidence "necessary to prove an element of the offense" for which
the felon was convicted may not also be used to prove an aggravating factor.58
For example, the use of a deadly weapon is listed as an aggravating factor but
is also an element of armed robbery.59 Second, the same evidence may not be
used to prove more than one aggravating factor.60 Finally, the judge is specifi-
cally prohibited from considering the defendant's request for a jury trial as an
aggravating factor.61 These prohibitions apparently are intended to eliminate
possible constitutional challenges to the Act.62
G.S. 15A-1340.4(a) lists numerous aggravating and mitigating factors.
These include:
1. Aggravating factors:
a. The defendant induced others to participate in the commis-
sion of the offense or occupied a position of leadership or
dominance of other participants.
b. The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from cus-
tody.
c. The offense was committed for hire or pecuniary gain.
d. The offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful
exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of
laws.
e. The offense was committed against a present or former law
enforcement officer, employee of the Department of Correc-
tion, jailer, fireman, emergency medical technician, ambu-
lance attendant, justice or judge, clerk or assistant or deputy
clerk of court, magistrate, prosecutor, juror, or witness
against the defendant, while engaged in the performance of
his official duties or because of the exercise of his official
duties.
f. The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
57. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a).
58. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1).
59. Id. § 14-87 (1981).
60. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
61. Id.
62. The listed aggravating and mitigating circumstances are broadly worded, thus the poten-
tial exists for overlapping. Because judges must ultimately weigh the aggravating factors against
the mitigating factors in a given case, they must be careful to avoid unwarranted overlapping.
The same evidence may not be used to constitute two or more factors, or to prove the underlying
felony and various factors. For a more complete discussion of the constitutionality of vague or
overlapping factors in a different context, see Comment, Evolving Standards of Decency: The
Constitutionality of North Carolina's Capital Punishment Statute, 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 737
(1980); Comment, Vague and Overlapping Guidelines: A Study of North Carolina's Capital Sen-
tencing Statute, 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 765 (1980).
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g. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to
more than one person by means of a weapon or device
which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more
than one person.
h. The defendant held public office at the time of the offense
and the offense related to the conduct of the office.
i. The defendant was armed with or used a deadly weapon at
the time of the crime.
j. The victim was very young, or very old, or mentally or
physically infirm.
k. The defendant committed the offense while on pretrial
release on another felony charge.
1. The defendant involved a person under the age of 16 in the
commission of the crime.
m. The offense involved an attempted or actual taking of prop-
erty of great monetary value or damage causing great mone-
tary loss, or the offense involved an unusually large quantity
of contraband.
n. The defendant took advantage of a position of trust or con-
fidence to commit the offense.
o. The defendant has a prior conviction or convictions for
criminal offenses punishable by more than 60 days' confine-
ment. Such convictions include those occurring in North
Carolina courts and courts of other states, the District of
Columbia, and the United States, provided that any crime
for which the defendant was convicted in a jurisdiction
other than North Carolina would have been a crime if com-
mitted in this State. Such prior convictions do not include
any crime that is joinable, under G.S. Chapter 15A, with the
crime or crimes for which the defendant is currently being
sentenced.
p. The offense involved the sale or delivery of a controlled
substance to a minor.
2. Mitigating factors:
a. The defendant has no record of criminal convictions or a
record consisting solely of misdemeanors punishable by not
more than 60 days' imprisonment.
b. The defendant committed the offense under duress, coer-
cion, threat, or compulsion which was insufficient to consti-
tute a defense but significantly reduced his culpability.
c. The defendant was a passive participant or played a minor
role in the commission of the offense.
d. The defendant was suffering from a mental or physical con-
dition that was insufficient to constitute a defense but signif-
icantly reduced his culpability for the offense.
e. The defendant's immaturity or his limited mental capacity
at the time of commission of the offense significantly
reduced his culpability for the offense.
f. The defendant has made substantial or full restitution to the
victim.
1982]
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g. The victim was more than 16 years of age and was a volun-
tary participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to
it.
h. The defendant aided in the apprehension of another felon
or testified truthfully on behalf of the prosecution in another
prosecution of felony.*
i. The defendant acted under strong provocation, or the rela-
tionship between the defendant and the victim was other-
wise extenuating.
j. The defendant could not reasonably foresee that his con-
duct would cause or threaten serious bodily harm or fear, or
the defendant exercised caution to avoid such consequences.
k. The defendant reasonably believed that his conduct was
legal.
1. Prior to arrest or at an early stage of the criminal process,
the defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing in
connection with the offense to a law enforcement officer.
m. The defendant has been a person of good character or has
had a reputation in the community in which he lives.
n. The defendant is a minor and has reliable supervision avail-
able.63
Many of these factors are similar to ones that may arise in a capital pun-
ishment sentencing proceeding; 64 thus, some guidance may be found in several
cases that have dealt with permissible interpretations of these factors. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has found prejudicial duplication of aggravat-
ing factors, 65 and has indicated that pecuniary gain is properly a separate ag-
gravating circumstance even in a felony-murder prosecution in which the
underlying felony is armed robbery.66 The court has considered what aggra-
vating circumstances may be taken into account in a rehearing on sentencing
in light of double jeopardy limitations67 and has interpreted the proper appli-
cation of the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance. 68 It has
also addressed the question of the proper instruction on impaired capacity,69 a
question that may be relevant to the mitigating factor that "defendant was
suffering from a mental or physical condition that was insufficient to constitute
a defense but significantly reduced his culpability for the offense."'70
Factors that appear on the Fair Sentencing Act's list of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances call for varying degrees of interpretation. For exam-
ple, determining whether the "defendant held public office at the time of the
63. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
64. See id. § 15A-2000(e), (f).
65. State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 28-30, 257 S.E.2d 569, 587-88 (1979).
66. State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 62-63, 274 S.E.2d 183, 204-05 (1981).
67. State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 261-72, 275 S.E.2d 450, 477-84 (1981).
68. State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 253-56, 278 S.E.2d 214, 219-20 (1981); State v. Hamelette,
302 N.C. 490, 504, 276, S.E.2d 338, 347 (1981); State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 264, 275 S.E.2d 450,
479 (1981).
69. State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 373-75, 259 S.E.2d 752, 763-65 (1979); State v. Johnson,
298 N.C. 47, 63-70, 257 S.E.2d 597, 610-14 (1979).
70. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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offense and [whether] the offense related to the conduct of [that] office" 7 1 is
relatively unambiguous. Determining whether "(t)he defendant took advan-
tage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense,"'72 however, is
less clear-cut.
The Act provides little guidance on the procedures and standards for
proving aggravating and mitigating factors. It only states that the judge "may
consider any aggravating and mitigating circumstances that he finds are
proved by the preponderance of the evidence, and that are reasonably related
to the purposes of sentencing, whether or not such aggravating or mitigating
factors are set forth herein."73 Second, the Act states that "[a] prior conviction
may be proved by stipulation of the parties or by the original or certified copy
of the court record of the prior conviction."174 A court record with the same
name as the one by which the defendant is charged is prima facie evidence of
the facts in the record. No conviction obtained while the defendant was indi-
gent may be used unless the defendant had access to counsel or waived that
right at the prior proceeding, and a defendant may move to suppress the evi-
dence of the prior conviction. 7
5
The previous approach to sentencing allowed the judge to set both mini-
mum and maximum terms, which the Parole Commission used as starting
points in determining release dates. In contrast, The Fair Sentencing Act pre-
cludes imposition of minimum terms 76 and allows only a single term to be
imposed for any one conviction. There are several specific statutes, however,
that impose a mandatory minimum period which the felon must actually
spend in prison.
First, a person prosecuted as a habitual felon must be sentenced as a Class
C offender unless the death penalty or life imprisonment is imposed. A habit-
ual felon is any person who has been convicted of, or who pleaded guilty to,
three felony offenses in any federal or state court in the United States. Several
types of felonies are statutorily exempted: those occurring prior to July 6,
1967; those for which the felon received a pardon; and certain federal liquor
offenses. Furthermore, all felonies committed before the offender was eight-
een will only count as one felony.77 The Fair Sentencing Act requires that the
71. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(n).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 15A-1351(b).
77. This provision was repealed by the General Assembly in the original version of the Fair
Sentencing Act, Law of June 4, 1979, ch. 760, § 4, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1st Sess. 850, and then
reinstated in the final version. Law of Apr. 6, 1981, ch. 179, [1981] 2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 84
(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1 (1981)).
According to a study conducted by the Institute of Government of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, only a handful of offenders are prosecuted as habitual felons each year.
Clarke & Kurtz, supra note 51, Table 10. It is entirely within the prosecutor's discretion to deter-
mine whether to prosecute an individual as a habitual felon. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.3 (1981). An
effective tool for reducing crime may be incapacitation of the repeat offender. James Q. Wilson
argues that because most serious crime is committed by repeat offenders, putting them in prison
would at least incapacitate them temporarily if it did nothing to deter them from future crime.
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habitual felon receive at least a fourteen year term although the presumptive
sentence for Class C is fifteen years.78 Thus, the judge has discretion to reduce
the Class C presumption by only one year. Like other felons sentenced under
the Act, the prisoner may receive day-for-day good time credit. But the statu-
tory requirement that a habitual felon serve not less than seven years in prison
probably means he is not eligible for normal reentry parole if he receives only
a fourteen-year sentence. 79 It is less clear whether "gain time" may be used to
reduce a felon's actual term of imprisonment to less than seven years. Under
the provisions of G.S. 14-7.6, a habitual felon "shall serve a term of not less
than seven years in prison excluding gain time granted under G.S. 148-13."80
This phrase is patently ambiguous; it is unclear whether the legislature in-
tended gain time to be excluded to the extent it caused the prisoner to serve
less than seven years, or whether only gain time may be used to reduce the
sentence below seven years. Finally, the habitual felon's sentence may not be
suspended, nor may he be placed on probation. The sentence must be im-
posed to run consecutively to any prior sentence. 81
A second provision similarly directed at the repeat offender is G.S. 14-
2.2.82 A statutory minimum prison stay of seven years is required for any
person convicted of using a deadly weapon to commit a felony if he was previ-
ously convicted of committing a felony in which a deadly weapon was used in
North Carolina in the past seven years. Neither felonies committed before the
defendant was eighteen years old8 3 nor those committed prior to September 1,
1977, for which the defendant pleaded guilty or no contest may be considered.
Although there is no requirement that the defendant be sentenced as a Class C
Wilson, "Lock 'em Up," N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 11. For example, of the
12,500 defendants appearing in a Baltimore, Maryland district court, eighty percent had been
there before. Rosenblatt, Why the Justice System Fails, Time, Mar. 23, 1981, at 22, 24. Although
statutes designed to deal with recidivist felons may be one of the more effective means of combat-
ting crime, they can lead to harsh results in some cases. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263
(1980), the United States Supreme Court upheld a mandatory life sentence upon commission of a
third felony. The challenged Texas law did not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment even though the three offenses were minor fraudulent financial transactions. The
defendant had managed to obtain property worth only a total of $229.11 in his three felonies.
78. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.6 (1981).
79. Good-time credits may reduce a sentence by one-half. See id. § 15A-1340.7(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1981). Therefore, awarding reentry parole could result in less than the mandatory seven
years. To the extent it reduces the actual time served below seven years, good-time credits appear
statutorily impermissible.
80. Id. § 14-7.6 (1981).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 14-2.2.
83. Although the criminal justice system has traditionally provided more protective proce-
dures for juveniles, recidivist juveniles are frequently hard core criminals by the time they reach
majority. One Pennsylvania study tracked the criminal careers of 10,000 males born in 1945.
About one third committed some offense by age sixteen, but most of this group had no further
contact with the law. However, a small number, 627, were arrested five times before they reached
majority, and were responsible for two-thirds of the violent crimes committed by the group, Ro-
senblatt, supra note 77, at 23-24. The problem of violent juveniles is complicated by the large
percentage of our population that is currently in the crime prone years of sixteen to twenty-six.
Wilson, supra note 77, at 45. Therefore, only allowing the consideration of one felony committed
while the offender is under 18 may not adequately deal with the person in his late teens or early
twenties who has repeatedly committed serious offenses.
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felon, he must receive at least a fourteen-year term because a lesser sentence
could result in less than seven years actually served when cut in half by receipt
of day-for-day good-time credit.84 He may not be sentenced as a committed
youthful offender, his sentence may not be suspended, and his sentence must
run consecutively to any other sentence currently being served. Unlike the
habitual felon provision, the repeat offender statute refers only to sentencing
after conviction and does not require separate indictment and prosecution for
the felon to be sentenced as a repeat offender.
In addition to these two statutes there are various other offenses for which
there is a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. These crimes are first
and second degree burglary,85 armed robbery,8 6 and several drug trafficking
offenses.87 These felonies have been assigned to classes, but the statutory min-
imum imprisonment presumably overrides the presumptive term for the as-
signed class.
When the offender is convicted of more than one felony, the sentencing
judge must either apply the presumptive term for each offense or make specific
findings justifying aggravation or mitigation of each term. Subject to the re-
strictions previously discussed, he may choose whether to suspend one or more
of the offenses88 and whether to make them run concurrently or consecu-
tively.89 No findings are required to explain these choices, nor are guidelines
established that must be followed in making them. Because many felons are
convicted of more than one offense, such decisions continue a broad area of
discretion.
III. APPELLATE AND POST-CONVICTION REVIEW UNDER THE FAIR
SENTENCING ACT
Appellate review of sentences imposed under the Act will be affected in
two ways. First, a defendant may appeal his sentence as a matter of right on
"the issue of whether his sentence is supported by evidence introduced at the
trial and sentencing hearing only if the prison term of the sentence exceeds the
presumptive term set by G.S. 15A-1340.4," and if the judge was required to
make findings as to aggravating or mitigating factors. 90 Consequently, felons
may not appeal as of right sentences imposed pursuant to a "plea arrangement
as to sentence under Article 58 of this Chapter," because no findings are re-
quired for such sentences. 91 Current law distinguishes between a plea ar-
84. See notes 103-29 and accompanying text infra.
85. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-52(a) (1981).
86. Id. § 14-87(a).
87. Id. § 90-95(h).
88. Id. § 15A-1351(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
89. Id. § 15A-1354(a).
90. Id. § 15A-1444(al). This supplements the provision that a defendant who pleads not
guilty and is convicted may appeal as a matter of right. Id. § 15A-1444. The right of a convicted
felon who receives less than the presumptive term to petition the appellate division for review of
this issue by writ of certiorari is not affected. Id.
91. Id. § 15A-1340.4(b).
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rangement concerning charges, which does not require judicial approval, and
an arrangement concerning sentence, which does require judicial ratifica-
tion.92 Any court discussion of a plea arrangement, or an arrangement re-
duced to writing, must be part of the record if the defendant pleads guilty to
the charges.93 The difficult question is what constitutes a "plea arrangement
as to sentence." 94 It may be an agreement to recommend a particular sen-
tence, or it may be simply an agreement not to oppose a particular sentence.
This broader interpretation of a "plea arrangement as to sentence" would re-
sult in fewer cases in which the trial court was required to impose the pre-
sumptive prison term or to make specific findings.95 It also would reduce the
number of defendants with an automatic right of appeal because the right of
appeal is contingent on the requirement that findings be made. Ultimately,
North Carolina's appellate courts must resolve what the legislature intended to
encompass under the phrase "plea bargain as to sentence."
Second, the existence of a record of findings on which a sentence other
than the presumptive term is based should facilitate appellate review.96 Al-
though most sentences in the past have been appealable only if they went be-
yond the statutory minimum or maximum for the offense,97 several cases have
resulted in a remand for resentencing when trial courts have stated in the rec-
ord egregiously improper reasons for the sentence imposed.98 The record re-
quired by the Act provides an appellate court with a means of determining if
there was sufficient evidence to support the sentence and if the judge abused
his discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.99
92. Id. § 15A-1023(c) (1978).
93. Id. § 15A-1023.
94. Id. § 15A-1340.4(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
95. Some judges are reluctant, however, to surrender their sentencing discretion to prosecu-
tors. Interview, supra note 3.
96. Although the Act facilitates appellate review, a defendant who does appeal his sentence
faces the possibility of an increased sentence. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969).
His sentence may not be increased, however, merely because he exercises his right to appeal. Id.
at 725; State v. Patton, 221 N.C. 117, 119, 19 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1942); State v. Lowry, 10 N.C. App.
717, 719, 179 S.E.2d 888, 889 (1971).
If the state chooses to grant a right to appeal, the prosecutor as well as the defendant may
appeal a sentence. The United States Supreme Court recently held that it does not violate the
double jeopardy clause to allow prosecutoral appeal of a sentence imposed under a special fed-
eral statute dealing with the dangerous offender. Even though the defendant ultimately receives a
greater sentence, it does not constitute multiple punishment because there is no expectation of
sentence finality under the circumstances. United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. 426, 438
(1981); see Note, United States v. Di Francesco: Continuing Jeopardy-An Old Concept Gains
New Life, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 425 (1982). See generally Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947)(imposition of fines subsequent to sentencing upheld); Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d 1172 (4th
Cir. 1972) (increased sentence after inmate's appeal upheld).
97. State v. Garis, 265 N.C. 711, 144 S.E.2d 901 (1965).
98. At least three North Carolina cases have resulted in sentence reversals when the trial
judge stated in the record impermissible reasons for the sentence imposed. See State v. Boone, 293
N.C. 702, 239 S.E.2d 459 (1977) (defendant given active sentence because he would not plead
guilty to lesser offense); State v. Swinney, 271 N.C. 130, 155 S.E.2d 545 (1967) (trial judge stated
sentence imposed because of defendant's participation in drunken party); State v. Snowden, 26
N.C. App. 45, 215 S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 251, 217 S.E.2d 675 (1975) (trial judge at-
tempted to usurp Parole Commission's discretion in setting sentence). See also S. Clarke, Sentenc-
ing Criminals: Issues in Recent Court Decisions, Popular Gov't., Winter 1979, at 7.
99. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1442(5a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). The court in State v. Lewis, 281 N.C.
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Post-conviction review is largely unaffected by the Act. It does require,
however, that motions for appropriate relief based on the claim that the sen-
tence is not supported by the evidence be made to the sentencing judge. The
Act inconsistently lists challenges to sentencing alleging insufficiency of evi-
dence with motions that must be made within ten days of the verdict' ° and
with motions permissible at any time.'0 1 Thus, it appears that such a sentenc-
ing challenge may be raised at any time.
IV. REENTRY PAROLE, GOOD TIME, GAIN TIME AND PROBATION UNDER
THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT
The expiration date of a prisoner's sentence under the Act is determined
by three variables other than the term of imprisonment imposed by the sen-
tencing judge-reentry parole, good time and gain time. All three are deter-
mined by the behavior of the prisoner and the discretion of prison officials. 10 2
Every felon sentenced to a term of eighteen months or more who was not
a Class A or Class B offender, and who was not sentenced as a committed
youthful offender,10 3 must now be paroled, and can only be paroled, at a time
ninety days before the expiration of his term,1°4 less credit for time served in
pretrial detention, for good time and for gain time. The purpose of this parole
is to aid the felon in his reentry to society. 05 If the parolee complies with
certain conditions of parole, 1° 6 he will be unconditionally discharged at the
end of the ninety days;107 however, if he violates the conditions so that his
parole is revoked he will be returned to prison to serve ninety days. He will
continue to accumulate good time and gain time and will be unconditionally
discharged at the expiration of no more than ninety days.108
Every prisoner' 0 9 is entitled to "good time," or the subtraction of one day
564, 189 S.E.2d 216 (1972), intimated one reason why appellate courts have traditionally deferred
to the sentencing discretion of the trial judge. "The trial judge in this, as in other criminal cases,
has the opportunity to observe the defendant and to consider his former record of criminal convic-
tions, if any, which the appellate court, being limited to the printed record before it, does not
have." Id. at 570, 189 S.E.2d at 220. Thus, the creation of a record of specific findings should aid
appellate review. See also State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126 (1962). For a due process
basis for this appellate deference to sentencing judges, see Freeman and Early, United States v.
DiFrancesco, Government Appeal of Sentences, 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 91, 118-121 (1980).
100. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1414(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
101. Id. § 15A-1415(b)(8).
102. Such rewards are a necessary means of maintaining control over prisoners. N.C. Justice
Academy, N.C. Dep't of Justice, Fair Sentencing Symposium Proceedings 10 (1980). Prison offi-
cials must provide, however, certain constitutionally-mandated procedures in awarding or revok-
ing good time and gain time. See note 114 and accompanying text infra.
103. A committed youthful offender is under twenty-one years of age and is sentenced under
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 148-49.10 to -49.16 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
104. Id. § 15A-1380.2(a) (Cure. Supp. 1981).
105. Id. § 15A-1380.2(b).
106. Id. § 15A-1374(b)(6)-(10).
107. Id. § 15A-1380.2(d), (e).
108. Id. § 15A-1380.2(f).
109. Although every prisoner may receive good time, some prisoners serving time for offenses
such as armed robbery may not receive all "day for day" good time since they must stay in prison
for a mandatory minimum term. See notes 77-87 and accompanying text supra.
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from his term for each day he serves without a major infraction of prison
rules.' 10 This credit includes time he spends in local jails, as well as time spent
in the Department of Corrections facilities. The Department of Corrections
must promulgate conduct rules, and give notice of them to every felon serving
a prison or jail term within thirty days of entry into the facility.1 I I The Act
specifies that there will be major and minor infractions, each subject to possi-
ble penalties, but does not state what constitutes a major infraction. Current
regulations list behavior such as participation in a riot, holding a person hos-
tage, intentionally inflicting self-injury, and selling prescribed medication as
major infractions, absent mitigating factors."t 2 Minor infractions include fail-
ing to keep living quarters clean, bartering, gambling, and feigning illness, as
well as other offenses. 1 3 The Act provides that "[a] prisoner charged with an
infraction shall receive notice of the charge and be afforded a hearing.""11 4
A prisoner may further reduce the time he must serve by earning "gain
time." This credit may be earned by work and by meritorious conduct; mis-
conduct will not cause it to be forfeited." 5 The Secretary of Corrections must
promulgate regulations for awarding gain time, but the Act specifies certain
award rates. A prisoner who works four hours each day will be credited with
two days for every month of work. A prisoner who works six hours per day
will receive four days credit per month; and if these jobs require special skills
or responsibilities or are part of a full-time work release program the prisoner
will be credited with six days per month. The Secretary has further discretion
to award extra days--as many as thirty days per month for emergency work or
a single meritorious act.116
Thus, every non-committed youthful offender felon sentenced to a prison
term under the Act, subject to limitations discussed previously, has the poten-
tial to reduce the term he must actually serve by one-half through good time
credit. Reentry parole will further reduce his term by one-fourth of a year,
and gain time may result in additional reductions.
Two forms of probation are available under the Act. Special probation is
carried over from the previous procedure and is available for persons con-
victed of Classes H, I and J offenses when there is no statutory prohibition
against suspension of the sentence.1 17 This allows the court to tailor an alter-
native to incarceration to meet the needs of the defendant. The probationer
110. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.7(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
111. Id. Prisoners must also be notified at time of entry of their projected release date, with
and without good time. Id. § 15A-1340.7(c).
112. 5 N.C. Admin. Code, § 2B.0302(16), (17), (29) & (37) (Aug. 11, 1981).
113. Id. § 2B.0302(1), (3), (7) & (9).
114. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.7(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Such a hearing for revocation of
good time already received is constitutionally required after the United States Supreme Court
holding in Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). By affording a hearing for any felon charged
with an infraction, the Act apparently assumes "good time" will ordinarily be accumulated, and
will only be revoked after adequate notice and proof of a major infraction. Thus, the Act goes
beyond the WoWff requirements.
115. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-13(d) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 15A-1351(a).
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may be required to serve a short period in either the custody of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, local authorities, or a treatment facility as a condition of
probation.118 The probationary period may not exceed five years under this
provision. Alternatively, the judge may suspend any sentence for any offense
other than a Class A or Class B offense, except those offenses for which sus-
pension is prohibited, such as burglary1 19 or armed robbery.120 Even though a
sentence is suspended, however, the judge must make specific findings if the
suspended prison term differs from the presumptive term.121
The Act does not affect many of the felons who are in or who will enter
the prison system; preexisting law will apply to those felons. Felons who com-
mitted offenses before July 1, 1981,122 will continue to be paroled under provi-
sions in effect at the time they committed the felony for which they are serving
time.' 23 Similarly, commited youthful offenders will continue to be sentenced
under previous statutory provisions.' 24 These provisions permit parole of
committed youthful offenders at any time.125 Persons sentenced to life as
Class A and Class B offenders will continue to be subject to previously estab-
lished parole proceedings, 126 and will be eligible for parole after twenty years
of imprisonment.' 27 Class C offenders who receive a term of life imprison-
ment may be paroled in twenty years.' 28 Finally, persons convicted of some
offenses for which there is a statutorily required minimum imprisonment, such
as the seven-year requirement for armed robbery, may not be paroled before
they have served at least seven years.' 29 Thus, it is unclear whether they will
be eligible for reentry parole if they have not yet served the full seven years.
V. HYPOTHETICAL CASE UNDER THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT-
FELON SMITH
Application of the Fair Sentencing Act procedures to a hypothetical de-
fendant may be instructive for those unfamiliar with its provisions. Felon
Smith, a twenty-three-year-old man from Orange County, North Carolina,
118. Id. This period of imprisonment may not exceed six months or one-fourth the maximum
term allowed by law, whichever is less.
119. Id. §§ 14-51, -52 (1981).
120. Id. § 14-87. Other provisions prohibiting suspension are the habitual felon provisions, id.
§§ 14-7.1, 7.6; the repeat offender section, id. § 14-2.2; and various drug trafficking provisions, id.§ 90.
121. Id. § 15A-1340.4(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
122. Id. § 14-7.6 (1981).
123. Handling prisoners sentenced under different statutory schemes creates administrative
difficulties for prison officials and may exacerbate prison unrest. See notes 154-57 and accompa-
nying text infra.
124. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1370.1 to -1377, 148-49.10 to -49.16, -51.1 to -64 (1978 & Cum.
Supp. 1981).
125. Id. § ISA-1371(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
126. Id. §§ 15A-1370.1 to -1377 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
127. Id. § 15A-1370.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
128. Id. § 15A-1371(a). Class C offenders who receive a life sentence are not eligible for "day
for day" good time. Id. § 148-13(c). They are eligible, however, for good time granted within the
discretion of the Secretary of Correction. Id. § 148-13(b).
129. See notes 77-87 and accompanying text supra.
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was charged with first-degree arson,130 a Class C offense. Because he was un-
able to reach a plea agreement with the prosecutor, he requested a jury trial. 131
The jury convicted him of second-degree arson (arson of an unoccupied dwell-
ing), 132 a Class D offense. Evidence at trial and at the sentencing hearing
showed that he set fire to a house owned by his ex-wife after a bitter argument
over his right to visit his three-year-old son. The jury found that the dwelling
was unoccupied at the time of the fire; however, extensive damage was caused
to the home. The defendant attended high school through the eleventh grade,
and was employed at the time of his arrest as a machine operator in a local
factory, earning $12,000 a year. He had been convicted previously at the age
of eighteen of breaking and entering.
What sentence should Felon Smith receive assuming all the data listed
above has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence? Because no plea
agreement on sentence was reached, the judge must impose the presumptive
term, whether or not he suspends it, unless aggravating or mitigating factors
dictate otherwise.
Possible factors in aggravation in this case are (1) that "[t]he offense in-
volved an attempted or actual taking of property of great value or damage
causing great monetary loss, or the offense involved an unusually large quanti-
ty of contraband"' 33 and (2) that the defendant had a prior conviction punish-
able by more than sixty days imprisonment.' 34 The judge may not consider
Smith's decision to request a jury trial as an aggravating factor.
Relevant mitigating factors are (1) that the defendant has a generally
good reputation in the community and a good work performance l35 and
(2) that "[tihe defendant acted under strong provocation, or the relationship
between the defendant and the victim was otherwise extenuating."' 136
The judge then weighs these factors and determines that in light of the
standard set by the legislature, and the counterbalancing circumstances, he
will impose the presumptive term. For a Class D offense that term is twelve
years imprisonment. 137 Because he chooses not to vary the presumptive term,
the judge need not make any specific findings for the record.
How much time, considering both pretrial detention and posttrial impris-
onment, will Smith actually serve? If he commits no major breaches of the
conduct rules he must receive reentry parole in 53 4 years. If prison or work
130. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-58 (1981).
131. It is unusual for a case actually to go to trial. According to a recent study, only seven
percent of the persons charged with committing a felony exercise their right to a jury trial. Clarke
& Kurtz, supra note 51.
132. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-58 (1981).
133. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(m) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
134. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(o).
135. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(m).
136. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a)(2)(i). The sentencing judge may consider any factors "reasonably
related to the purposes of sentencing," whether or not they are specifically listed in the statute.
Any factor considered, however, must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 15A-
1340.4(a).
137. Id. § 15A-1340.4(f).
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release employment is available he may further reduce his sentence through
gain time by more than one year. Thus, Smith can expect to serve no less than
4 to 4 years for his offense.
VI. THE IMPACT OF THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT
The Fair Sentencing Act began as an attempt to revamp the basic ap-
proach to sentencing in North Carolina. It is unlikely, however, that the Act
as finally passed will have dramatic effect. But it still. may have a significant
psychological impact on those who are involved in the correctional system-
legislators, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, prison officials and defend-
ants. It may also focus debate about needed improvements in the criminal
justice system.
In establishing a presumptive prison term for each offense, the legislature
was, in theory, stating its view. of the appropriate prison term for a given
crime. It also was stating its view that the fairness of the system would be
manifested by the equality of sentences imposed on similarly situated felons.
But the legislature continued its practice of giving sentencing discretion to trial
judges by allowing them to choose the appropriate sentence in a given case.
The judge may choose to suspend the sentence altogether without giving any
reasons, and there are wide ranges for each class of offenses from which a trial
judge may choose if he believes there are sufficient aggravating or mitigating
factors proved.
Although the Act actually has done little to inhibit the exercise of judicial
discretion, judges may be hesitant to deviate from this legislative expression of
the public will. There are several disincentives for imposing other than the
presumptive term. First, it is possible that the deference some judges believe is
owed to the will of the public as contained in the legislative enactments may
discourage variation from the presumptive term. Judges may regard the pre-
sumptive term as the normal term that the legislature has prescribed for a
person who commits a felony, absent unusual circumstances. Thus, judges
may believe that in the majority of cases the presumptive term should be
imposed.
Second, a disincentive may be found in the requirement of a record of
findings to support any variation from the presumptive term that is not the
result of a "plea arrangement as to sentence pursuant to Article 58 of Chapter
15A." Although the Administrative Office of the Courts has provided a sen-
tencing form, 138 some judges may consider it an undue burden to specify the
relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.
Third, judges may be reluctant to subject their decision to automatic ap-
pellate review by imposing a sentence greater than the presumptive term.139
138. The Administrative Office of the Court has devised a form for use after the Act goes into
effect. Because it involves little more than checking boxes and completing blanks, the form should
not take the sentencing judge more than a few minutes to complete. See note 50 supra.
139. One commentator has cited two reasons for judicial opposition to sentencing on the rec-
ord: (1) it provides a means for appellate review and reversal; and (2) it subjects sentencing deci-
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Given the traditional deference appellate courts accord trial court sentencing
decisions, it is unlikely that many sentences will be reversed. The requirement
of a record of findings, however, at least affords a basis for examining the
decision against the evidence presented at trial or at the sentencing hearing.
The Act may achieve to some extent its primary goal of structuring judi-
cial discretion. Because the rationale for variations from the presumptive
prison term must be on the record, legally irrelevant factors may have less
influence on the sentence. The Act's documentation requirement may aid in
eliminating, for example, the sub silentio use of sex as a mitigating factor and
race as an aggravating factor in sentencing.
But the promise of equal punishment for equally grave offenses will not
be achieved until a substantive redefinition of offenses is undertaken. 140 The
Act inherits all the inconsistencies present in substantive criminal law. The
legislature has attempted to corral old, imprecise definitions of crimes into a
new structure resulting in some irrational allocations. For example, possession
of counterfeiting tools and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious in-
jury are both Class H felonies with a three-year presumptive term.1 41 Further-
more, there are still wide ranges in permissible prison terms for each class of
offenses. A Class C felon may receive a prison term of any length between
zero and fifty years if the trial judge finds the relevant factors warrant varia-
tion from the presumptive term.
Another problem with the classification system and the assigned pre-
sumptive sentence is the harshness of the prescribed terms. A basic premise of
those who first proposed presumptive sentencing is that the effectiveness of
punishment is in its certainty, rather than in its severity. It was the view of the
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force that 'vresumptive sentencing be accompa-
nied by a considerable reduction in the length of sentence authorized by legisla-
tures, imposed by courts, and served by prisoners.,' 142 The duration of
confinement in North Carolina in recent years has been one of the highest in
the country.143 Although the legislature made significant reductions in the
presumptive term in its last revision of the Act,144 it failed to alter potential
maximum terms, consequently, the average term of imprisonment may not
change dramatically.145 Further reductions are necessary even if the Act
sions to political attacks or public criticism. Both of these effects would jeopardize judicial
discretion. G. Robin, Judicial Resistance to Sentencing Accountability, 21 Crime & Delinquency
201, 206 (1975).
140. The entire criminal code is currently under study by the Criminal Code Commission. A
new code should be introduced to the legislature by 1983.
141. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-13, -32(b) (1981); id. § 15A-1340.4(f) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
142. Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, supra note 6, at 32 (em-
phasis in original).
143. Nat'1 L.J., supra note 4.
144. Law of Apr. 6, 1981, ch. 179, § 5, [1981] 2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 84 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(f) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
145. The original version of the Fair Sentencing Act caused the Department of Correction to
predict that presumptive sentencing could result in an initial increase of the prison population,
with a subsequent tapering off. N.C. Justice Academy, supra note 102, at 10. Glenn G. Williams
of the Department of Correction has predicted that the final form of the Act should have little
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slightly reduces the length of actual terms of imprisonment. Throughout the
1970s, the prison population was growing 146 in North Carolina to the point
that currently it has more prisoners per capita serving more than one year than
any other state. 147 The cost of maintaining adequate correctional facilities
and the scarcity of government resources mandate a reduction of the prison
population, and one means of accomplishing this goal is by imposing shorter
sentences.
Although certainty of punishment may be a more effective deterrent to
crime than severe sentences, the Act does little to increase certainty. Since so
many felons are exempted from the Act, most significantly those who reach a
plea bargain on their sentence, overall certainty of sentence may not be
affected. The Act will make more certain the sentence of a felon who comes
within the ambit of the statute ifjudges seldom depart from the presumptive
prison term-but a mechanical adherence to the presumptive term is neither to
be desired nor expected. The Act is further emasculated as a means of ensur-
ing certainty in sentencing by the provisions allowing suspension of sentences,
imposition of consecutive sentences, and parole at any time of committed
youthful offenders. 148
A major impact of the Act is the shift of discretion from the Parole Com-
mission to other points in the punishment system. The legislature has assumed
a greater role by establishing presumptive terms and mandatory prison terms
for certain offenders.149 Prosecutors may have increased bargaining discretion
after the Act goes into effect because judges may be more willing to ratify a
effect on the prison population. To Study The Needs of Additional Prison Facilities and Court-
room Personnel in North Carolina: Public Hearing on S.B. 281 (Mar. 26, 1981) (personal notes of
author) (statement of Glenn G. Williams) [hereinafter cited as Public Hearing on S.B. 281].
146. In part because of the impact of the baby boom, the 1970s saw a dramatic increase in the
prison population. Wilson, supra note 77, at 45. Statistics from the North Carolina Department
of Correction indicate that the average number of felon inmates increased from 5,952 in 1970 to
12,660 in 1980. As of March 1981 there were over 16,000 inmates in North Carolina prisons
alone, without counting those in local jails. The prisons were seeing a long-term increase of 100
inmates per month. Public Hearing on S.B. 281, supra note 145 (statements of William F. Naegel
& Jeff Williams). For a discussion of the problem of prison crowding in North Carolina see
Austin, N.C. Prison System Feeling Space Squeeze, News & Observer (Raleigh), Apr. 12, 1981,§ 4, at 1, col. 4.
Paralleling the rise in prison populations has been a rise in suits by prisoners challenging the
constitutionality of prison conditions. Several states have been ordered to remedy the conditions
in their jails and prisons. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Adams v. Mathis, 614
F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1980); Burks v. Teasdale, 603
F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979); Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979); Chapman v.
Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct.
2392 (1981).
The high costs of prisons have caused some states to look for alternatives to incarceration.
Minnesota, for example, has provided an opportunity for counties to obtain state funding for
community development and operation of correctional programs. Minn. Stat. §§ 401.01 to .16
(Supp. 1980).
147. Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions, U.S. Dep't of Justice (1980).
148. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1340.4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (suspension of sentences); id.
§ 15A-1354(a) (consecutive sentences); id. § 148-49.15 (parole of committed youthful offenders).
For example, forty-nine percent of felons under twenty-one who were sentenced in 1979 received
committed youthful offender status. See S. Clarke, S. Kurtz, E. Rubinsky & D. Schleicher, Felony
Prosecution and Sentencing in North Carolina Before Determinate Sentencing Legislation (Insti-
tute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1982) (unpublished
manuscript).
149. See notes 77-87 and accompanying text supra.
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sentence bargain since it relieves them of the necessity of making findings.
Defendants may be more willing to bargain if they know it is likely they will
get at least the presumptive sentence at trial, or if the prosecutor is willing to
reduce the charges from one class to another.
An individual defendant may have greater bargaining power if prosecu-
tors refuse to plea bargain in a large number of cases. An accused without
significant aggravating factors associated with his offense may count on receiv-
ing no more than the presumptive sentence if he goes to trial. There would be
little reason not to go to trial if the prosecutor refused to reduce the charges or
to agree to recommend a sentence less than the presumptive term. Even a
small increase in the number of defendants who exercise their jury trial rights
could exacerbate the problem of crowded dockets and overworked
prosecutorial staffs. 150
A basic rationale for presumptive sentencing is the regulation of the sen-
tencing discretion of individual judges. Under the Act little actual limitation
has been achieved. Judges still may sentence within wide ranges, suspend
sentences, and choose to impose terms to run concurrently or consecutively in
most cases. For felons under twenty-one, they still may decide who will be
sentenced as a committed youthful offender with eligibility for parole at any
time. Judges still have the option of ratifying sentence plea bargains. But the
psychological effect of the Act may be to inhibit the exercise of discretion. As
previously discussed, judges may be unwilling to deviate from the presumptive
term for a variety of reasons.151
One beneficial impact of the Act may be increased emphasis on the sen-
tencing hearing by judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Although the
Act imposes no presentence report requirements, 15 2 judges may wish more
complete presentations because of the mandate that they consider all mitigat-
ing and aggravating factors listed in the Act before sentencing. They can do so
only if the competing attorneys introduce all relevant information, a practice
infrequently used today. The prosecutor seeking a severe sentence should at-
tempt to introduce all possible aggravating information, just as defense attor-
neys should bring forth mitigating information.15 3 Although the old system
150. Wade Barber of the North Carolina District Attorney's Association believes the Act will
increase the demand for court personnel because it will significantly increase trial time. He argues
that the Act will formalize sentencing procedures, require more court time in making findings of
fact, and require more preparation by both prosecutors and court-appointed counsel for the sen-
tencing hearing. Even an increase of a small percentage of defendants going to trial could dra-
matically increase the amount of court time spent in trial. Additional court time will be tied up
with motions filed by defense attorneys to determine what the state considers to be aggravating
factors and in learning the new procedures. Public Hearing on S.B. 281, supra note 145 (statement
by Wade Barber).
151. See notes 138-39 and accompanying text supra.
152. The American Bar Association Standards on Sentencing suggest that all courts should be
provided "with the resources and supporting staff to permit a verified presentence investigation
and a written report of its results in every case." ABA Standards Relating to the Administration
of Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, Standard 18-5.1(a) (tent. draft 2d ed.
1979).
153. Howard Twiggs of the N.C. Academy of Trial Lawyers advocates several actions a de-
fense attorney may take to best represent his client at the sentencing hearing. Presumptive Sen-
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also had these incentives, the requirement of written findings to support
sentences may provide greater impetus for thorough sentencing preparation by
all parties.
The Act may have a dramatic effect on the administration of the prisons.
One goal of determinate sentencing in general is to reduce discontent among
prisoners.154 Wide ranges in sentences among prisoners and uncertain terms
upon entering prison are two major causes of prison unrest. 155 The Act may
alleviate disparities in sentences to some extent; it allows determination of the
time a prisoner will serve at the start of his term much more reliably than
present North Carolina law permits. The Act requires that every prisoner be
told his projected release date, with and without good time, when he enters
prison.156 He also must be notified at entry of the rules of conduct he must
observe. "Good time" and "gain time" are much more important under the
Act because prisoners are no longer paroled before they receive any benefit
from their accumulated good time. Under the old parole procedure, accumu-
lated time served only to reduce the maximum term a prisoner might serve;
generally, his release date was keyed to his minimum term. Under the Act the
minimum-maximum system is abolished and "good time" and "gain time" are
used to determine release date.
The addition of prisoners sentenced under a new procedure may cause
two problems for prison officials. First, there will be the administrative chore
of tracking inmates as they serve their sentences. The appropriate procedures
tencing, supra note 2, at Twiggs-22-26. No presentence reports are required under North Carolina
law but they may be ordered by the court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1332 (Cum. Supp. 1981). A
defense attorney, however, may make a motion for a presentence investigation before trial or for a
presentence commitment study after conviction. These latter reports are available only to the
defendant, his counsel, the prosecutor and the court. Id. § 15A-1333.
The individual defense attorney should obtain background information about the client from
the first interview. The sentencing brief should be prepared before trial, and letters or testimony
from character witnesses should be solicited. The client should be encouraged to make restitution
or at least develop an appropriate plan for compensating the victim.
If there is no agreement with the prosecutor on a plea, the defense attorney should strive for
agreement on possible mitigating and aggravating factors. At the very least defense attorneys
should request through discovery a list of the aggravating and mitigating factors the prosecutor
intends to present at trial. Imagination should be used in suggesting mitigating factors in addition
to those used in the statute. The probable cause hearing may be used to cross-examine the state's
witnesses about potential aggravating factors.
Because the sentencing hearing should require more preparation, attorneys must adjust their
fees to allow for their additional time. The legislature should allocate sufficient funds to allow
counsel for indigent defendants adequately to prepare. Attorneys should use their office support
personnel to aid in collecting relevant data so that attorney time may be most effectively used.
Presumptive Sentencing, supra note 2, at Twiggs-9-19.
In short, the defense attorney should recognize that he can often most realistically provide the
greatest help for his client at the sentencing hearing rather than at the guilt determination phase.
Interview, supra note 3.
154. Unfortunately, if determinate sentencing increases the overcrowding in prisons, as has
happened in Indiana since it abolished parole, prison unrest will probably increase. For a discus-
sion of problems caused by the growth of prison populations, see Lieber, The American Prison: A
Tinderbox, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
155. See notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra.
156. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.7(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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must be correlated with each prisoner and any significant change in applicable
law will complicate that task.
A more significant problem may arise from the mingling of inmates sen-
tenced under the Act with those serving time under the old system. If the
theory is correct that prison unrest is fostered by disparate treatment, then a
whole new sentencing program will greatly increase the possibility for compar-
ison. Although two individuals may actually serve the same time, they may
consider the different procedures unfair. For example, one prisoner will be
earning good time and have a definite release date, while his neighbor is still
subject to the whim of the Parole Commission. It will take years before all
persons serving time have been sentenced under the same procedures. This
argument should not be given undue weight, however, because it cuts against
any change in the sentencing system no matter how necessary. Furthermore,
the Parole Commission may equalize some disparities because it will still de-
termine the release date for felons sentenced under the old system. 157
VII. CONCLUSION
Most predictions about the effect of the Act are currently little more than
speculation. It will most certainly fail to meet the high hopes of its most
ardent proponents or the fears of its opponents. A systematic assessment of
the Act's effects will be provided by the statistical study undertaken by the
Governor's Crime Commission in its study of felony prosecution and sentenc-
ing. Carried out by the Institute of Government in Chapel Hill, this study will
be completed in 1982.
One immediate effect of the Act is apparent to even the most casual ob-
server of the criminal justice system and the legal community. The Act has
generated extraordinarily heated debate in North Carolina among legislators,
judges, lawyers, and editorialists. At one point it seemed that only Governor
Hunt supported the bill. Judges objected to restrictions on their discretion,
prison officials projected tremendous overcrowding, defense attorneys pre-
dicted draconian sentences, and prosecutors projected a flooding of the courts.
After amendments that reduced presumptive terms and exempted sentence
agreements, however, the differing factions either accepted or resigned them-
selves to the bill.
But the debate begun by the Act about desirable changes in the North
Carolina criminal justice system has not ended. Legislators are meeting to
learn about the cost of prisons and overcrowding in North Carolina. 58 A
committee appointed by the Governor is studying the relative severity of pun-
ishments in North Carolina.'5 9 A private citizens' commission is studying al-
157. For example, the Parole Commission could speed up release dates to equalize sentences
or relieve overcrowding. This would not be possible for prisoners sentenced under the Act.
158. See, e.g., Public Hearing on S.B. 281, supra note 145.
159. Governor's Study Commission on Length of Sentences, chaired by Judge Willis Which-
ard of the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
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ternatives to incarceration. 160 The Institute of Government has held seminars
on sentencing approaches of other states. 161 The press is investigating the
problems plaguing the prison system and is evaluating the Act. 162 Finally, the
entire criminal code is scheduled for revision in 1983,163 which may again put
in issue the whole sentencing structure.
The debate it has engendered may be the most positive effect of the Fair
Sentencing Act. If it stimulates rational, informed discussion by a large por-
tion of the legislative and legal communities about criminal justice problems
in North Carolina, desirable changes should occur. The state may develop a
system that no longer results in some of the highest rates of confinement and
average time served in the country. Whether it also develops a more equitable
system depends upon the actions taken in response to this debate.
SUSAN KELLY NICHOLS
160. Citizens' Commission on Alternatives to Incarceration, also chaired by Judge Whichard.
161. Seminar on Determinate Sentencing, Jan. 30, 1981 (Institute of Government, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (personal notes by author).
162. See, e.g., News & Observer (Raleigh), Apr. 1, 1981, at 18, col. 1; id., Apr. 5, 1981, § 1, at
26, col. 1.
163. This revision is being undertaken by the CrimiA'al Code Commission, chaired by Allan
Bailey.
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